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Practically Reframing Rights: Culture, 
Performance, andJudging 
Eric K. Yamamoto • 
This Essay explores "cultural performance" and legal process.) 
More particularly, the Essay speaks to legal advocates not about 
crafting doctrinal arguments but about some of the problems and 
possibilities of shifting the cultural frameworks of decisionmakers 
- frameworks that color how those decisionmakers understand 
hard evidence and social context in cases. In doing so, this Essay 
weaves a layered story of a pending United States Supreme Court 
case into an account of a multi-faceted Hawaiian hula dance per-
formance, tying both to a developing LatCrit praxis. 2 
We start with a story of indigenous Hawaiians. 
I. RICE V. CAYETANO 
At this wntmg, the Court is in the process of deciding Rice v. 
Cayetano,S probably the most important Hawaiian rights case ever. 
Rice puts at risk all of the federal and state Native Hawaiian pro-
grams designed to repair continuing harms to the Hawaiian 
* Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i Law 
School at Manoa. Copyright Eric. K. Yamamoto 1999. My thanks to Maile Shimabukuro for 
her research assistance and Brandon Kekoa Paredes for his contribution to the descriptions 
of the hula and the Kaho'olawe hula perfonnance. 
I See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts and the Cultural Peiformance: Native Hawaiians' 
Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAw. L. REv. 1 (1994) (describing legal 
process as cultural perfonnance and legal procedures (particularly discovery) as instruments 
for shaping competing narratives about larger controversy); see also infra section IV (discuss-
ing role of "cultural perfonnance" in meaningful decisionmaking). 
• See infra note 26 and accompanying text (stating that developing LatCrit praxis in-
fuses strategic social-legal action with critical theoretical insights). I write as a third genera-
tionJapanese American (sansei), born in Hawai'i. I am not a Native (or indigenous) Hawai-
ian. I also write as an Asian American working in communities to build bridges between 
Asian Americans and Hawaiians. Part of that work is, by invitation, "Hawaiian rights" litiga-
tion addressing land and water issues. Some of it involves assisting extra-legal attempts to 
reconcile Hawaiianjustice grievances against the federal and state governments and against 
"settlers" to the islands. 
• Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000), rev'g 146 F.3d. 1075 (9th Cir. 1998); see also 
infra Coda II (explaining Supreme Court's decision). 
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people 4 resulting from the now acknowledged, U.s.-aided, illegal 
overthrow of the sovereign nation of Hawai'i in 1893. This illegal 
overthrow led to the confiscation of Hawaiian land and the de-
struction of Hawaiian culture.5 Rice raises issues of: (a) political 
status contrasted with racial status (in applying equal protection 
doctrine); (b) historical acuity versus historical myopia in multira-
cial settings; (c) legal norms of self-determination vis-a-vis equality; 
(d) international human rights rather than domestic civil rights, 
and; (e) colonialism and conquest vis-a-vis sovereignty and libera-
tion. By raising issues of political status, historical consciousness, 
self-determination, human rights and colonialism, Rice plays out in 
compelling fashion socio-Iegal themes central to foundational Lat-
Crit theory.6 
So, who has a stake in this "Hawaiian" case? Certainly the in-
digenous Hawaiian communities have a stake, particularly those 
struggling to deal politically as well as socially with the conse-
quences of U.S. colonialism, including Hawaiians' highest rates of 
poverty, unemployment, incarceration, serious illness, and home-
• See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act § 4006(a)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) 
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing particular protection to properties with cultural and 
religious importance to Indian tribes and Native Hawaiians); Native Hawaiian Education 
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7912 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (establishing programs to facilitate 
education of Native Hawaiians); Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 
§ 4106(d), 21 U.S.C. § 1177(d) (1994) (giving preference to grant applications aimed at 
combating drug abuse among Native Americans, classification that expressly "includ[es] 
Native Hawaiians"); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 
3001-3013 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (extending protection to American Indian and Native 
Hawaiian burial sites); Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 166, 29 U.S.C. § 2911 (1994) 
(supporting employment and training programs for Native Hawaiians and other Native 
Americans); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998) (pledging to protect and preserve Native Hawaiian faiths as subset of religions de-
scribed in statutory heading as "Native American"); Native Hawaiian Health Care Improve-
ment Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11701-11714 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (creating number of 
programs aimed at improving health care for Native Hawaiians); Comprehensive Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act § 4577(c) (4) (1994) 
(giving preference to grant applications aimed at combating drug abuse among Native 
Hawaiians and other Native Americans); Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Housing 
Act § 958, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079, 4422 (1990) (providing preference for Native 
Hawaiian in HUD housing assistance programs). 
5 See TOM COFFMAN, NATION WITHIN: THE STORY OF AMERICoA'S ANNEXATION OF THE 
NATION OF HAWAI'I (1998). 
6 See, e.g., Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical 
Legal Scholarship, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 1 (1997); Colloquy, International Law, Human IUghts 
and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 177 (1997). 
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lessness in their homeland.' Also Native Americans have a stake 
because they perceive that Rice-supporters, such as amici Robert 
Bork and Abigail Thernstrom,8 are endeavoring to fry bigger fish, 
including all nontribal American Indians, especially those that are 
beneficiaries of government programs. Latinas/ os and LatCrit 
theorists - those linking contemporary legal strategies concerning 
immigration, language, citizenship and political participation with 
earlier anticolonial, Chicano self-determination movements in the 
U.S. - also have a stake.9 And finally, African Americans, Asian 
Americans, white Americans, women, gays, and lesbians that are 
combating the pervasive conservative "retreat from justice" in law 
and politics have a stake in Rice. 
The Rice case is about a white American rancher's efforts to in-
validate a Hawaiians-only election of trustees to the Office of Ha-
waiian Affairs ("OHA").IO OHA is an entity created by the Hawai'i 
Constitution (through an amendment in 1978) to represent Ha-
waiian people in dealings with the state and its control as trustee 
over "ceded lands.,,11 Ceded lands comprise roughly one-third of 
the entire lands of Hawai'i. They are former Hawaiian govern-
ment and royal lands taken by the U.S. upon annexation of Ha-
wai'i as a territory in 1900 following illegal overthrow of the Hawai-
ian government in 1893 by U.S. military-backed American busi-
nessmen. 12 Upon statehood in 1959, the U.S. turned over most of 
the ceded lands to the new state in trust. One of the five classes of 
trust beneficiaries, set forth in the federal statehood act and in the 
, See, e.g., LUCIANO MINERBI ET AL., NATIVE HAWAIIAN AND LOCAL CULTURAL 
AssESSMENTPROJECf 15 (1993). 
8 See Brief for Amici Curiae Center for Equal Opportunity, New York Civil Rights Coali-
tion, Carl Cohen, and Abigail Themstrom in Support of Petitioner, Rice v. Cayetano (U.S. 
filed May 27, 1999) (No. 98-818), available in 1999 WL 345639 [hereinafter Brieffor Amici 
Curiae Center for Equal Opportunity]. 
9 See RODOLFO F. ACUNA, ANYTHING BUT MEXICAN: CHICANOS IN CONTEMPORARY Los 
ANGELES (1996). 
10 I have provided legal counsel to, and represented in litigation, two current OHA 
trustees, Haunani Apoliona and Collette Machado. 
II See HAw. CONST. art. XII, §§ 5-6 (establishing board of OHA trustees and defining 
their powers). 
12 See Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 
Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to Offer an Apology to Native Hawaiians on 
Behalf of the United States for the Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Pub. L. No. 103-
150, § 1, 107 Stat. 1510, 1513 (1993) (expressing Congress's "commitment to acknowledge 
the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper 
foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people" 
and urging President to support reconciliation efforts, in sections 1 (4) and 1 (5». 
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Hawai'i Constitution, is "native Hawaiians."I~ 
OHA was created in 1978 to represent Hawaiians' previously ig-
nored legal interest in the ceded lands trust and the revenues it 
generated. 14 OHA's assets now exceed one-half billion dollars, and 
OHA's trustees spend that money on programs addressing social, 
economic, and cultural needs of Hawaiian people. In addition to 
these functions, some Hawaiian communities view OHA as a transi-
tional entity toward some form of Hawaiian sovereignty.15 Indeed, 
the state, as a result of its breach of fiduciary duties, is currently 
negotiating with OHA for the transfer of lands and over $300 mil-
lion as reparations (and legal settlement). The transfer and set-
tlement will generate land and additional monetary assets, in the 
eyes of some, for Hawaiian self-govemance.16 
Rice, the American rancher plaintiff, is arguing that Native Ha-
waiian is purely a racial category and that OHA's Hawaiian-only 
voting restriction is subject to invalidation under the encompassing 
strict scrutiny equal protection standard of review for racial classifi~ 
cations as set forth in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. I ' Further, 
Rice is contending that Hawaiians cannot claim the Native Ameri-
can exception from strict scrutiny review, recognized by the Court 
in Morton v. Mancan,18 because Hawaiians are not a formally recog-
nized "Indian tribe." In 1974, Mancan deemed Native American to 
be a "political" designation (reflecting a special sovereign-to-quasi-
sovereign relationship), rather than a "racial" one, even though 
race clearly was integral to the designation. The Court located 
federal authority for that special relationship in the Constitution's 
13 See Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959). Section 5 (f) of the Admission 
Act establishes a public land trust on cenain lands (and the proceeds from those lands) 
granted or conveyed to the State of Hawaii by the United States under sections 5(b) and 
5(e). See id. The State of Hawaii holds the section 5(f) trust lands for five purposes. See id. 
One is "for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians." Id. 
14 See, e.g., H.B. 2207, § 2,1997 Haw. Laws 329 (allocating revenues to OHA). 
15 Others view OHA as little more than a state agency beholden to prevailing political 
powers in the state. See HEALO .HEALO (FACE TO FACE): HAWAIIAN VOICES ON SOVEREIGNlY 
(Hawai'i Area Office of the American Friends Serv. Comm., 1993); Samuel P. King, Hawai-
ian Sovereignty, HAw. BJ.,July 1999, at 6,7-8. 
16 See generaUy Trustees of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d 446 (Haw. 
1987), em. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987) (describing legislative mandate for OHA and effect of 
land transfer). 
17 515 U.S. 200,224 (1995). 
18 417 U.S. 535,554-55 (1974). 
2000] Practically Reframing Rights 879 
enumeration of federal power over "Indian tribes.,,19 
Both the federal district court for Hawari20 and the Ninth 
Circuit21 unequivocally rejected Rice's arguments. They recognized 
that, even without formal tribal status, indigenous Hawaiians are 
similarly situated to Native Americans. Both are first peoples in the 
U.S., both suffered forms of colonial/imperial conquest, and both 
are now the beneficiaries of a special trust relationship with the 
government because of this "political" status. Therefore, the lower 
courts held that Hawaiians, like Native Americans, should be con-
sidered "political" minorities in the U.S. for purposes of equal pro-
tection analysis.22 Pursuant to Mancari, both courts recognized that 
the rational basis rather than strict scrutiny standard of review ap-
plies and upheld the OHA voting restriction. 
During the pending appeal, OHA supporters are developing 
additional arguments grounded in critical theory. They are main-
taining that through entities such as OHA, Hawaiians are not as-
serting civil rights (to be deemed equal to others in the U.S.). 
Rather they are asserting international human rights: not the right 
to be equal but the right to self-determination; not a right to 
19 Id. at 552 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3, which grants Congress power to regu-
late commerce "with the Indian tribes"). Neither Adarand nor the Court's Native American 
cases following it held that Adarand overruled Mancari. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 
634 (1978); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). But cf Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE 
LJ. 537, 564-65 (1996) (attempting to distinguish these cases). 
20 See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1555 (D. Haw. 1997), affd, 146 F.3d 1075, 
(9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000). 
21 See Rice, 146 F.3d at 1082. But see infra Coda II (discussing Supreme Court's decision, 
which reversed Ninth Circuit's ruling). 
22 Both courts also rejected Rice's Fifteenth Amendment argument. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated: 
If, as we must, we take it as given that lands were properly set aside in trust for na-
tive Hawaiians; that the State properly established an Office of Hawaiian Affairs to 
hold title to, and manage, property set aside in trust or appropriated exclusively 
for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians; and that OHA is properly governed by a 
board of trustees whose members are Hawaiian, it follows that the state may ra-
tionally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run 
and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide 
who the trustees ought to be. Put in another way, the voting restriction is not 
primarily racial, but legal of political. Thus, we conclude that Rice's argument 
fails under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments for essentially the 
same reasons. 
Id. at 1079. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit based on the Fifteenth 
Amendment. See Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1060; see also infra Coda II (explaining Supreme Court's 
decision). 
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monetary compensation, but a right to reparation in order to re-
connect spiritually with land and culture; not a right to full partici-
pation in the U.S. polity, but some form of governmental sover-
• 23 
elgnty. 
So why did the Court grant certiorari? Why did the conservative 
Center for Equal Opportunity support the certiorari petition and 
Bork, Thermstrom, and several other conservative groups file ami-
cus briefs? Why did the U.S. Solicitor General, after much discus-
sion, file a strong brief in support of OHA's position?24 And why 
did the U.S. Department of the Interior, recendy, in connection 
with the case, formally acknowledge a special trust relationship 
between the federal government and Native Hawaiians?25 
Given this Court line-up, two questions emerge: what members 
of the Court might be key to the Rice decision? And through what 
cultural lens will they process "facts and context"? 
The first question reaches beyond simple vote counting or iden-
tifying swing votes along a liberal-conservative continuum. It 
speaks to who, through powers of insight and conviction, might 
persuade others on the Court and in the public. The second ques-
tion is epistemological, and it sharpens the first. It asks how the 
decisionmakers' cultural framework might shape their understand-
ings of Hawaiian political history and, more importandy, contem-
porary Native Hawaiian claims and government responses. In 
terms of LatCrit praxis,26 the second question asks how a decision-
maker's cultural framework might appropriately be tweaked, and 
perhaps transformed, through and beyond the legal process, to 
generate new understandings of "facts and context" relevant to 
23 See Draft of Brief for Amici Curiae Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, 
Honolulu Chapter (JACL-Honolulu), Eric Yamamoto, and the National Asian Pacific Ameri-
can Legal Consortium (NAPALC) (not filed, on file with author) [hereinafter Draft of Brief 
for Amici CuriaeJACL-Honolulul. 
24 SeeJohn Yaukey, Advocate Bork Files Brief in OHA Case, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,July 31, 
1999, atAl, AS. 
25 See id. 
26 See Enrique Carrasco, Introduction to Panel Three: Intellectuals, Awkwardness, and Activ-
ism: Towards Social Justice Via Progressive Instability, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 317 (1997); Mar-
garet E. Montoya, Academic Mestizaje: Re/Producing Clinical Teaching and Re/Framing Wills as 
Latina Praxis, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 349 (1997); Laura M. Padilla, LatCrit Praxis to Heal 
Fractured Communities, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 375 (1997). See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, 
Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 
MICH. L. REv. 821 (1997) (discussing critical race praxis). 
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cases. To explore these questions, we begin by considering cul-
tural transformation and legal process. 
II. CULTURE AND LEGAL PROCESS 
Some attorneys in Rice identify Justices O'Connor and Kennedy 
as likely swing votes. Others look at Justice Ginsburg as a poten-
tially key persuader. These are, of course, surmises. No one, even 
Court insiders, can safely predict how justices will cast their vote. 
"[O]bjective, value-neutral" doctrinal analysis leading to "inevitably 
correct" answers is rarely possible, because complicated social and 
political value judgments usually are pivota1.27 
At the same time, merely assessing decisionmakers "values and 
interests" often leads to fuzzy conclusions. Broad ideological la-
bels, like liberal and conservative, are at best crude analytical 
shortcuts. Often they are misleading. Indeed, Cass Sunstein's as-
sessment of recent Court decisionmaking concludes that constitu-
tional cases tend to be decided more on the particulars than over-
arching principles.28 
Another reason for the difficulty of prediction is that so many 
factors interact in judicial decisionmaking, including how judges 
interpret hard evidence, assess credibility and construe prior case 
holdings. An individual judge'S acts of interpretation, assessment 
and construction do not occur in a vacuum or according to fixed 
mental proce~ses. Rather those acts are affected significantly by 
the decisionmaker's "cultural framework" - that amalgam of per-
ceptions, beliefs and practices that psychologists and anthropolo-
gists tell us serve as a lens through which people process (and 
come to understand) information about their social and political 
world.29 
Culture is not simply shared practices or values. It is a "system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of 
which [group members] communicate, perpetuate, and develop 
their knowledge about attitudes toward life." Although in crucial 
27 See generaUy KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
0(1960). 
28 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw (1995); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CAsE AT A 
TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
29 See generaUyJEROME BRUNER, THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION (1996); CUFFORD GEERTZ, 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE 1\,"ID TRUTH: THE 
REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1989). 
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respects multidimensional, shifting, and regenerating, a group's 
culture "provides the framework, the anchor, in which a range of 
choices and values can be considered and evaluated."~o 
That framework, forged in social settings, "shifting and regener-
ating," is susceptible to continual change as cultural conditions 
change. Those changes in framework and their influence on per-
ceptions and actions often occur subconsciously. For "[c]ulture 
transmits beliefs and preferences not as explicit lessons but as what 
seems to be a part of a person's rational ordering of society. In 
most instances, people fail to recognize the influence of cultural 
experience on racial beliefs or the ways those beliefs shape their 
actions."31 
For the pending Rice appeal then, a threshold praxis inquiry is 
what cultural lens (or framework), what amalgam of perceptions, 
beliefs and practices, will likely shape justices' understandings of 
Hawaiian history and contemporary conditions and government 
responses to historical injustice? Or, more specifically, what cul-
tural framework will likely influence whether the Court deems Na-
tive Hawaiians a "political" rather than "racial" minority for pur-
poses of equal protection analysis? While this latter question is of 
paramount legal import, the inquiry it generates is heavy in social 
and historical interpretation, assessment and construction. 
If, through their cultural lens, in good faith, decisionmakers see 
Hawaiians as just another brown group, no different from any 
other racial group save for skin color, then Rice prevails and, very 
likely, OHA and other Native Hawaiian government programs 
fall. 32 If their cultural framework enables decisionmakers to turn a 
blind eye to Hawaiian history (and the significance of the loss of 
Hawaiian nationhood) or to reduce race to an abstraction ("we are 
all one race - American"), the material conditions of Hawaiian 
life will be profoundly and adversely impacted.33 Similarly, if deci-
30 ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CMLRiGHTSAMERICA91 (1999). 
" See id. 
32 This is, in effect, the argument advanced by amici Bork and Themstrom. See Brief 
for Amici Curiae Center for Equal Opportunity, supra note 8. 
33 C! John Hope Franklin, As for OUT History, in RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS,Q 
1938-1988, at 49, 69-70 (1989) (describing pervasive, if uncertain, influence of historical 
conceptions on social action). Franklin stated: 
No one can say with certainty just what influence historical conceptions have had 
on the minds of men, nor can one accurately predict the impact of such concep-
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sionmakers see Hawaiians and think only of "lovely hula hands and 
white sand beaches," if they look with jaundiced eyes at Hawaiians' 
_ enduring struggles to reclaim land, reinvigorate spirituality, and 
restore self-governance and see nothing resembling Native Ameri-
can experiences, then OHA and its voting limitation will likely be 
trivialized as "racial preferences" that discriminate against white 
Americans like Rice.34 
But what if the Justices interpret, assess, and construct through a 
different cultural lens, a lens that highlights the present-day conse-
quences of the loss of nationhood35 and that allows deep apprecia-
tion of connections between Hawaiian land, culture and govern-
ance? If we assume, as I do for this Essay, that such a lens might 
significantly, and appropriately, help shape decisionmakers' un-
derstandings of "facts and context," then new praxis questions 
arise: How do non-Hawaiian, nonindigenous American justices 
acquire that cultural framework? More particularly, what kind of 
cultural transformations might be needed and how might those 
transformations be engendered? 
I have no sweeping answers to these complex questions. Indeed, 
each situation for each person will likely be different. Neverthe-
less, in the remainder of this Essay, I begin to unravel some of 
those complexities and open up transformational possibilities. 
This brings us to our second story. 
III. JURISTS-IN-REsIDENCE: EXPERIENCING KAHO'OLAWE 
My law school has the good fortune of having a Justice visit the 
school for a week every other February. A difIerentJustice spends 
the week as the Jurist-in-Residence, teaching law classes, meeting 
Id. 
tions on human relations in the future. But historical traditions have controlled 
the attitudes and conduct of peoples too often to pennit a denial that history has 
been an important instrument in shaping human affairs. 
... The Rice case involved only a white American plaintiff. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. 
Supp. 1547, 1548 (D. Haw. 1997), affd, 146 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 1044 
(2000). If, however, decisionmakers find Hawaiians to be simply another racial group, as 
distinguished from a "political minority," then Hawaii's nonwhite racial groups, for instance 
Mrican Americans or Asian Americans, would be allowed to assert discrimination claims. . 
.. The indicia of loss of nationhood (as distinguished from the hann or unequal or 
discriminatory treatment) include the loss of control over government structure, voting, 
economic, educational and justice systems, language, and land usage. See Draft of Brief for 
Amici Curiae jACL-Honolulu, supra note 23. 
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with faculty and students and talking with judges and other mem-
bers of the state bar. The Justices talk about judicial decisionmak-
ing, past Court decisions, lawyering ethics, and, sometimes, per-
sonal history. The students, in return, engage in rigorous ex-
changes and often share something special of Hawai'i's many cul-
tures. This coming year Justice Scalia will participate in the pro-
gram. Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Stevens participated in the 
36 recent past. 
What does any of this have to do with the Rice case? Nothing 
directly. The Court accepted certiorari in Rice long after the last 
Jurist-in-Residence program two years ago. And the justices do not 
discuss federal or state cases even potentially appealable to the 
Court. No one at the school, and no one in the state bar or judici-
ary, ever attempts, or has attempted, through the program to in-
fluence a pending case. 
Yet justices, as most people, live as members of society. Elec-
tronic media, journalism, popular culture, arts, literature and so-
cial interactions, and personal experiences affect, in part, their 
cultural frameworks. Those frameworks, I have suggested, help 
shape how they interpret hard information, assess credibility and 
construe ambiguous concepts, how they perceive and order a com-
plex, dynamic social and legal world. Writing of the linkage of le-
gal justice to judicial understandings of Mrican American experi-
ences, Wendy Scott Brown put it eloquently: 
[R]esolving factual issues and doctrinal inadequacies [or ambi-
guities] does not rest solely on the strength of evidence or the 
persuasiveness of argument. The lack of knowledge and appre-
ciation for the concrete experience of the powerless and op-
pressed hinders the judiciary's ability to construct just solutions 
.... Resolution, therefore, requires border crossing to begin the 
process of uncovering and then reforming judicial cultural 
biases.
37 
36 See Sean Clark, Justice in the School, 22 MAi..AMAlMtA, July-Dec. 1998, at 10. The Jurist-
in-Residence is organized every other year by Judge Myron Bright of the U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in conjunction with the William S. Richardson School of 
Law, University of Hawai'i at Manoa. 
l7 Wendy Scott Brown, Transformative Desegregation: Liberating Hearts and Minds, 2 J. 
GENDER, RACE &JUST. 315, 344 (1999). 1 would substitute the word "limitations" for "biases" 
at the end of the quoted passage in the text. 
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Consider the border crossing possibilities, the transformative po-
tential, of a multifaceted hula dance program performed by a mul-
tiracial group of law students and faculty during the Jurist-in-
Residence program two years ago. 38 The students chose the songs, 
choreographed the hulas, wrote the narration, rehearsed, sewed 
outfits, made flower and leaf leis, and performed hulas to ancient 
Hawaiian chants and contemporary Hawaiian songs.39 And they 
did so with a spirit of generosity, as an act of cultural sharing. Yet, 
this simple act was experienced on many levels by performers and 
audience in the music auditorium. 4o 
"" The Hawaiian art form of hula, or dance, plays an important role in recounting 
history and in perpetuating the indigenous culture of Hawai 'i, In its purest form, the hula is 
a type of storytelling. Through intricately placed hand and feet motions, as well as calcu-
lated facial and body expressions, a hula dancer, with precision, power, and grace, can 
physically depict a traditional Hawaiian legend, or describe the events of a day (like the birth 
of a child, or the coronation of a king), or convey a political message. Through this perfor-
mative storytelling, hula helps pass from generation to generation deep understandings of 
history, culture, and identity, as the stories and their meanings are conveyed by hula teacher 
to student and by students to audiences. 
For example, the hula UAia Iii '0 Pele i Hawai'i," describes the epic of Pele, goddess 
of fire and the volcano. Pele, a story intermeshing spirituality, kinship and environment, 
teaches anew each time it is performed. A hula student learns much more than just the 
physical motions of the hula; the student must study the language, history and culture, as 
well as the dance movements, to gain a both intellectual and visceral understanding of the 
performance. When a hula dancer performs a hula for an audience, the spirit of that hula 
story as well as its particulars are shared. 
,., Hula is pe'rformed in two general forms: hula kahiko (ancient hula) and hula 'auana 
(modem hula). Hula kahiko is performed to the accompaniment of Hawaiian chanting and 
beat drumming of the traditional Hawaiian ipu (gourd) or pahu (wooden drum). It is the 
formal hula, demanding great concentration. Hula kahiko is considered traditional be-
cause, prior to western contact in Hawai'i, all hula were performed in this fashion. Prior to 
the performance, the kumu hula, or hula teacher, choreographs the often powerful dances, 
drawing on historical and cultural knowledge, and rigorously trains the dancers. During the 
performance, the kumu hula chants the Hawaiian lyrics of the chant and provides a beat for 
the hula dancers. Traditional hula attire is worn during a hula kahiko performance. For 
women, traditional hula attire includes a pa'ii (knee-length skirt), and a matching blouse. 
For men, a malo (loincloth) or pii'ii are appropriate. Hula dancers adorn themselves with 
traditional leis made from the palapalai (fern), 'ohi'a lehua (a native flower), or other 
greenery. 
Hula 'auana is an informal style of hula. It is a hula performed to the accompani-
ment of nontraditional instruments such as the 'ukulele, guitar, piano, and bass and to 
singing. The hula 'auana movements are often flowing in contrast to the generally stronger, 
sharper movements of the hula kahiko. With the arrival of nontraditional musical instru-
ments to Hawai'i, the Hawaiian style of music changed. The hula also adapted. Hula 
'auana is most popular for the beautiful attire often worn during the performance. Because 
the style is informal, hula dancers may be creative in their movements and attire. 
40 I was one of the musicians for the performance. My vantage point was thus one of 
participant-observer. 
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To feel some of what brought tears to students eyes, animated 
smiles on Justice Ginsburg's and Judge Myron Bright's faces and 
prompted the school's dean to say that this "is one of my proudest 
moments," I share with you a bit of the actual hula performance. 
That performance blended chanting, singing, guitars, dances, 
flowers, and narration. Its theme was Kaho 'olawe. Sense as you 
read. 
***** 
You just heard Koa Paredes (hula teacher and law student) open 
with a traditional oli ho 'okipa, or welcoming chant, that gives greet-
ings. Now, Halau KaleipaukOpua 'enaikala would like to present 
ho 'okupu or gifts of lei to the justice and judge. Koa will accom-
pany this ho 'okupu presentation with a traditional oli lei, or lei 
chant. [Leis presented]. 
[Narration with Hawaiian guitars playing and thirty dancers 
walking silently on stage and taking their dance positions]. Centu-
ries ago, when the fIrst canoes of Polynesian explorers arrived 
from Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands, they landed at Kaho'olawe, 
the smallest of eight main islands in the Hawaiian archipelago. 
These f"IrSt Hawaiians dedicated the island to Kanaloa, god of the 
sea. Kaho 'olawe was viewed as the physical embodiment of Kana-
loa, and the god's mana, or spiritual power, was held within the 
island's rich soil. Also known as Kohemalamalama, or "shining 
birth canal," the island has been a center of religious, cultural, his-
torical- and now political- importance to Native Hawaiians. 
For hundreds of years the island was fruitful and supported 
thriving Hawaiian communities that were adept at astronomy, navi-
gation, f"lShing, and adz-making. During the 1800s, after Europe-
ans and Americans began settling Hawai'i, the island's population 
dwindled and private ranching became dominant. 
Through a lease with the Kaho'olawe Ranch Company, the U.S. 
military began its use of Kaho'olawe as a practice target for aerial 
bombs in the 1920s. Subsequently, during World War II, the U.S 
government took control of the island, banned all civilian access, 
and dosed f"lShing areas. In a 1953 executive order, President 
Eisenhower set the island aside for massive target practice by navy 
bombers. The bombing of Kaho' olawe continued unabated for 
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over half a century, causing untold damage to the hundreds of cul-
tural sites and fragile environmental resources. 
During the 1970s, a group of young Native Hawaiians from the 
islands of Moloka'i and Maui started an organization dedicated to 
stopping the bombing and reclaiming Kaho 'olawe for Hawaiian 
people. They formed the "Protect Kaho 'olawe 'Ohana (family)," 
or PKO. As an integral part of the Hawaiian political and cultural 
"Renaissance," this passionately committed group began a cam-
paign to raise awareness about the destruction of their sacred 'aina 
(land). InJanuary 1976, nine set fool on the island, engaging in a 
act of peaceful civil disobedience. 
Although the Coast Guard quickly escorted the protestors to 
nearby Maui and eventually cited several for trespassing, PKO con-
tinued its landings on Kaho 'olawe's shores. The controversy esca-
lated. An archeological survey of the island found thirty sites eligi-
ble for the National Register of Historic Places, and PKO f'Iled a 
federal lawsuit against the Navy alleging violations of environ-
mental and historic preservation laws. 
But the bombing continued, and the protest intensified. 
In early 1977, PKO leader George Helm, along with Kimo 
Mitchell, returned to the island to search for two others. Attempt-
ing to paddle-surf back to Maui seven miles away, Helm and 
Mitchell were lost at sea. Their deaths marked a critical point in 
PKO's struggle to reclaim Kaho'olawe, and the Navy's bombing of 
the island. 
Three years later, the PKO and Navy settled the lawsuit. The 
Navy agreed to survey Kaho'olawe's resources, to begin clearing 
unexploded ordnance, and to allow PKO limited island access for 
religious and cultural activities. It also granted PKO stewardship 
over part of the island and agreed to diminish Navy bombing. In 
1990, President Bush halted altogether the bombing of 
Kaho'olawe. 
Five years ago, on May 7, 1994, the U.S. transferred title to 
Kaho 'olawe to the state and established a joint venture among the 
federal and state governments and PKO to oversee restoration of 
the island. The lengthy multimillion-dollar restoration process is 
underway. And the island is visited regularly by Hawaiian cultural 
practitioners and by multiracial groups, supervised by PKO, to 
work on restoration of religious, cultural, and natural sites. 
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Koa chose this story as the theme for today's performance to 
share this unique part of Hawai'i's history with our visitors and as a 
way to express our hope for Hawai'i's future. 
[Narration at the beginning of the first hula segment]. To begin 
our hula performance, the halau (hula group) will perform a hula 
kahiko - a dance in the ancient style - that was written for a cere-
mony celebrating the return of Kaho'olawe to the people of Ha-
wai'i in 1994. The chant tells of the origin and beauty of 
Kaho'olawe, as well as its desecration by military bombing. This 
chant calls to the island, the "shining birth canal," to begin its re-
birth. [Thirty dancers move powerfully and gracefully to Koa's 
reverberating chant and the pounding beat of a single ipu (gourd 
drum)]. 
[Narration at the beginning of the second hula segment]. The 
second hula will be a hula 'auana, or modern hula, entitled, "Aloha 
Kaho'olawe," performed by law students Arleen Watanabe and 
Kanoe Kunishima. Then, the men of the halau will perform an old 
Hawaiian favorite entitled "Kaho 'olawe." This song is a love story 
that compares the beauty of Kaho 'olawe to a loved one. The 
women will follow with "Mele 0 Kaho'olawe, a much-loved mele 
aloha 'aina, or song that speaks of one's spiritual love for the land. 
This mele was composed by Uncle Harry Kiinihi Mitchell, a re-
spected leader in the protect Kaho'olawe movement, whose son 
Kimo was lost at sea. 
He aloha no Kaho'olawe (A loving tribute to you, Kaho'olawe). 
[Hula to three songs follow accompanied by Hawaiian guitars and 
singing in Hawaiian language]. 
[Closing]. The hula is one important way we can all deepen our 
understanding of and appreciation for Hawai'i, its history, land, 
and people. Mahalo. Thank you for allowing us to share our love 
of hula with you today. We leave you with a special treat - a {'mal 
song entitled "Kepa 'a" danced by Koa. The song calls to us all, "E 
kepa'a kakou ma hope 0 ka 'aina!" We must all stand FIrm on the 
land. 
IV. TRANSFORMATION? 
What impact might this deeply engaging cultural performance 
have had on ajustice and judge's cultural lenses for understanding 
"facts and context" years later in a case not then contemplated? 
Perhaps none at all. Yet, might the performance have begun or 
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furthered an altered or expanded way of knowing about "being 
Hawaiian" - influencing how decision makers might more mean-
ingfully (or accurately) interpret, assess and construct? Might it 
have stimulated a continuing process of cultural translation? Later, 
through a refocused lens, might history and contemporary condi-
tions reveal Native Hawaiians as indigenous peoples in the U.S., 
whose struggles and government treatment are most aptly charac-
terized as "political" rather than "racial"? Answers are speculative. 
But these and other questions themselves yield insights. 
Did you, as reader, without experiencing the sights, sounds and 
smells, find the hula performance engaging? As presented here in 
very limited fashion, did the performative acts collectively in some 
small way open your senses, your perceptions, to a broader, deeper 
understanding of Hawaiian history (and indeed Hawaiianness) and 
the stakes in Rice - an understanding you may have missed from a 
straight informational lecture or traditional legal brief? Can you 
imagine if you had been present, the potential for some kind of 
cultural transformation, beyond intellect, at a visceral level, that 
might later help shape how you interpret, assess and construct? 
Possibly. If so you, why not others? Why not justices and judges? 
* * * * 
So what praxis insights might we draw about the salience of inter-
cultural film, poetry, song, dance, language, literature, fine arts, 
spiritual meditation and historical storytelling in crafting larger 
legal strategies? In what settings? For what audiences? Over what 
periods of time? With what limitations, risks, and transformative 
potential? 
Consider, in a very different setting, the efforts in Germany to 
employ "music as a force for healing wounds of the Holocaust and 
of the Middle East today.,,41 Monetary reparations by the German 
government and Swiss banks for Holocaust survivors and their 
families have been, for some, significant steps toward atonement. 
Yet, for many Jews, the wounds remain deep and complex. What, 
beyond money, might help people to feel things in a different way, 
to see one another in a somewhat brighter light, and maybe even 
to help transform buried anger and distrust? In August 1999, 170 
41 Roger Cohen, IsraelisJoin Germans in Concert at Buchenwald, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,1999, 
at E1. 
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musicians from the Bavarian State Orchestra and the Israeli Phil-
harmonic - including Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, Israelis and 
Germans - played a path-breaking joint concert beneath the hill 
of Buchenwald, the former Nazi concentration camp. They played 
Gustav Mahler's Symphony 2, the "Resurrection," just hours after 
many of them together visited the Buchenwald site. The concert 
followed days of post-rehearsal discussions about history, identity 
and communication facilitated in part by Palestinian scholar and 
musician Edward Said. 
For a violinist from Lebanon, "the first two days it was rather 
tense, because I think we all had stereotypes about the other na-
tionalities .... But as we talked and played, these ideas tended to 
fade." For others the process was about transforming relationships 
broken by history. "This concert was about the past . . . . It was 
about showing that even the past symbolized by Buchenwald can be 
overcome, and the Germans whose forebears murdered Jews can 
sit now with Israelis and play the music of Bohemian:Jewish-
Austrian-German composer." And for still others, the larger ques-
tion was not whether, but how, we reconcile? "The issue, in the 
end, in the Middle East, is how to be together." How do we accept 
and then move beyond the history, the words of apology and even 
monetary reparations to transform the spirit? As the director of 
the Berlin State Opera said, "music is an ideal form.,,42 
Consider also Sharon Hom's LatCrit III presentation about and 
demonstration of a multilayered cultural performances.43 She en-
couraged us, and by extension decisionmakers, in contemplating 
the potential and problems of "human rights" rhetoric and prac-
tice across differing cultures, to hear, literally and figuratively, in 
differing registers. And she encouraged us not so much by telling 
us as by impelling us to listen in that way. She played a protest-rock 
recording of a Chinese rock star, sung in Mandarin, with unusual 
(to western ears) chord patterns and melody lines, while she voiced 
over her interpretation and insights in English, all backed visually 
by Chinese lyrics on a large overhead screen. That translating, 
head-and-spirit, border-rlissolving performance both challenged 
42 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43 See Sharon K. Hom, Lexicon Dreams and Chinese Rock and RoU: Thoughts on Culture, 
Language, and Translation as Strategies of Resistance and Reconstruction, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
1003, 1006-17 (1999); see also supra Part IV (describing role of "cultural performances" in 
meaningful decision making ) . 
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and touched people in the room. A profoundly different way of 
knowing about "rights" and what it means inter-culturally to be 
"human." Transformative? Perhaps, for some. Openings for 
transformation? I think so, for many. 
So, with these cultural performances in mind, we end where we 
began, with questions informed by a developing LatCrit praxis. 
How might cultural justice performances strategically (and ethi-
cally) be deployed throughout the legal process to create openings 
for transformation? How and when might they contribute to alter-
ing decision-makers' (and potentially larger society's) cultural 
lenses for assessing, for judging? And, in acting strategically, how 
can we critically recast the role of cultural performance in practi-
cally reframing rights? 
E kupa'a kakou rna hope 0 ka 'aina. 
* * * * 
CODAl 
Mter I submitted this Essay for publication, the Court heard oral 
argument in Rice. Many Native Hawaiians, including several OHA 
trustees, traveled from Hawai'i to Washington D.C. to attend. Set 
forth below are two excerpts from the official hearing transcript. 
(The transcript does not list the questioning Justices' names, but it 
is clear from context that Justice Ginsburg is the speaker in the 
second excerpt.) The questions and comments of the Justices ap-
pear to reflect more than simple differences of opinion. They ap-
pear to suggest significantly differing cultural lenses for processing 
and comprehending complex facts and context. 
In light of this Essay's praxis theme, ask yourself this question as 
you read the excerpts: To what extent, if at all, might different cul-
tural justice experiences have g~nerated differing interpretive 
lenses for viewing understanding colonial history, cultural geno-
cide and reconstructive efforts of indigenous people in North 
America and Hawai'i? 
One Justice posed a hypothetical to illustrate that OHA's voting 
requirement unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race. It ad-
dressed ostensible Hawaiian discrimination against Tahitians. The 
framing and language of the hypothetical suggested a cultural lens 
blind to history and present-day political and social conditions, 
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including a lack of recognition of how racial categories, like politi-
cal ones, are socially constructed.44 
QUESTION: May I ask on the racial discrimination point, suppos-
ing there is a citizen of Hawaii who has the same racial makeup as 
the native Hawaiian, he came, however, from Tahiti or some 
place else, and is a citizen of the State, has exactly the same race 
as the others, but he's denied the vote. Would he be denied the 
vote on account of race? 
QUESTION: Well, I - even if the Tahitian is of the same race, I 
mean, the fact that you give special privileges to some people of 
one race, though not to all people of that race, would not make it 
any better, would it?45 
The second justice's comments reflected a sharply contrasting 
cultural lens, one that appreciated the complex history of Ameri-
can colonial expansion, land confiscation and cultural destruction 
as well as the significance of current efforts to restore aspects of 
lost nationhood. The comments responded to Rice's argument 
that technically Hawaiians should not be considered a Native 
American "tribe" and, therefore, could not be accorded "political 
minority" status, like American Indians under Morton. 
QUESTION: [O]ne part of it I don't understand. Hawaii wasn't 
organized into many tribes, but it did - it was a kingdom. It was 
a sovereign kingdom, with its language and culture, and even cui-
sine, and the United States had a large hand in destroying that 
sovereignty, and indeed Congress passed this Remorse Resolution 
[1993 Hawaii Apology Resolution] recognizing that the United 
States was in large measure responsible for the destruction of the 
sovereignty of these people. So if the idea of tribal sovereignty, 
restoring some of the dignity that was lost as a result of what this 
Nation did, works for Native Americans, I don't understand why it 
doesn't also work for people who were a sovereign nation, who 
were stripped of their sovereignty, whose land was taken without 
ii See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d 
ed.1994). 
45 Oral Argument on Behalf of Petitioner, Rice v. Cayetano, 68 U.S.L.W. 3288, (U.S. 
Oct. 6, 1999) (No. 98-818), available in 1999 WL 955376, at *5-*6. 
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their consent and without any compensation. The analogy seems 
• 46 
to me qUIte strong. 
Quite strong, indeed. 
CODA II 
As this Essay was going to press, the Supreme Court decided Rice 
v. Cayetano,47 reversing the lower courts and declaring OHA's Ha-
waiians-only voting requirement violative of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment's ban on racial discrimination. As feared, it also opened the 
door to suits to invalidate all govemment-connected Native Hawai-
ian programs. From the perspective of many, the Court majority, 
led by Justice Kennedy, just did not "get it.,,48 The majority's view 
of the history of Native Hawaiians is highly selective and sanitized. 
It views OHA's voting requirement simply as a racial preference for 
Native Hawaiians. 
As I commented elsewhere with Chris lijima: 
The Court's decision grossly distorted the history of Hawai'i. 
Nowhere did it mention U.S. colonialism in 1898, in Hawaii or in 
the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Nor did the Court acknowledge 
the destruction of Native Hawaiian culture through the banning 
of Hawaiian language, or the current effects of Native Hawaiian 
homelands dispossession: high rates of poverty, homelessness, 
and incarceration . . . . The Court never specifically referred to 
whites, even though Rice's claim was implicitly one of "reverse 
discrimination" against whites. And nowhere did the Court dis-
cuss the vibrant Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement that gave 
birth to OHA. 
Perhaps most astonishing was the Court's dismissive treatment 
of two hugely significant facts. First, there was little mention of 
the extraordinary U.S. Congressional Apology Resolution of 
1993, in which the U.S'- government acknowledged its complicity 
in the illegal overthrow of the Native Hawaiian government in 
46 Jd. at *12. 
47 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000). 
48 See Eric K. Yamamoto & Chris Iijima, The Colonizer's Story: The Supreme Courl Violates 
Native Hawaiian Savcreignty - Again, 3 COLORLINES, Summer 2000 (visited Apr. 25, 2000) 
<http://www.colorlines.com> (on file with author) (describing reactions to Court's opin-
ion). 
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1893 and committed the U.S. to future acts of reconciliation. 
Second, the decision failed to mention that OHA and its voting 
limitation were created by an overwhelming vote of Hawai'i's 
multiracial populace. 
What emerges from the Court's historical account is a simple 
story of "reverse racial discrimination" against Freddy Rice. In 
this view, Hawaiians had a rough go of it, as did immigrant 
groups, but the playing field now is pretty much leveled. U.S. 
colonization supposedly left no scars; therefore "privileges" for 
Native Hawaiians are not only undemocratic, they are illegal. 49 
In their dissent, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens excoriated the 
majority for this distortion of history - for its failure to get it: 
The Court's holding today rests largely on the repetition of 
glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the 
compelling history of ... Hawai-i. When that history is held up 
against the manifest purpose of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, and against two centuries of this Court's federal 
Indian law, it is clear ... that Hawai-i's election scheme should be 
upheld.
50 
Reflecting Justice Ginsburg's insightful comments at oral argu-
ment, and underscoring the importance of the viewer's cultural 
lens for seeing and making sense out of social "facts," the dissent 
concludes: 
[I]t is a painful irony indeed [for the majority] to conclude that 
native Hawaiian people are not entitled to special benefits de-
signed to restore a measure of native self-governance because 
they currently lack any vestigial native government - a possibility 
of which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived 
them.
51 
The tensions in the Court's opinions highlight the significance 
of this Essay's thematic questions: How might cultural justice per-
formances strategically be deployed throughout the legal process 
to create openings for transformation? When might they contrib-
49 [d. 
50 Rice, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1062 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
51 [d. at 1066. 
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ute to altering decision-makers' (and potentially larger society's) 
cultural lenses for assessing, for judging? The search continues. 
